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NON-CARTESIAN SUBSTANCE DUALISM AND
MATERIALISM WITHOUT REDUCTIONISM
Eleonore Stump

The major Western monotheisms, and Christianity in particular, are
often supposed to be committed to a substance dualism of a
Cartesian sort. Aquinas, however, has an account of the soul which
is non-Cartesian in character. He takes the soul to be something
essentially immaterial or configurational but nonetheless realized in
material components. In this paper, I argue that Aquinas's account is
coherent and philosophically interesting; in my view, it suggests not
only that Cartesian dualism isn't essential to Christianity but also
that the battle lines between dualism and materialism are misdrawn.

Introduction
Many philosophers suppose that the major monotheisms, and Christianity
in particular, are committed to substance dualism of a Cartesian sort.
Descartes explained his dualism in this way:
"my essence consists solely in the fact that I am a thinking thing. It
is true that I may have (or, to anticipate, that I certainly have) a
body that is very closely joined to me. But nevertheless, on the
one hand I have a clear and distinct idea of myself, in so far as I am
simply a thinking, non-extended thing; and on the other hand I
have a distinct idea of body, in so far as this is simply an extended,
non-thinking thing. And accordingly, it is certain that I am really
distinct from my body, and can exist without it."l
On this view, a person may have a body but is neither identical with
it nor composed of it, and intellectual processes ("thinking") occur only
in the nonmaterial thing that is the person, not in the body. There are
"close" connections between a person and his body. The cognitive
processes of the person have effects on the body which that person has,
and bodily processes, such as sensations, have effects on the person; so a
person and his body interact causally. But intellectual cognitive functions are not exercised in or by the body; they take place in the thinking
essence that is distinct from the body.
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So understood, Cartesian dualism i~; widely regarded as false. If it is
also the case that the major monotheisms have traditionally been committed to dualism of a Cartesian sort, then in the view of many philosophers
the apparent or putative falsity of Cartesian dualism becomes an embarrassment for those religions. As a matter of historical fact, however, it is
not true that a Cartesian sort of dualism has been the view traditionally
espoused by all the major monotheisms. Thomas Aquinas, whose views
surely represent one major strand of one major monotheism, is familiar
with an account very like that of Cartesian dualism, which he associates
with Plato; and he rejects it emphatically.
In this paper, I will explore Aquinas's position. I will look at his rejection of a Cartesian sort of dualism and a t the position he adopts in place of
it. I will also consider the broader metaphysical issues within which
Aquinas's account of the soul is situated, and I will examine the explanation Aquinas's account gives of the theological doctrine of the afterlife.
Then I will turn to the vexed business of taxonomy. How should
Aquinas's position be identified? For example, where - if anywhere - on
the contemporary spectrum of opinions should Aquinas's account be located? Finally, I will briefly discuss the way Aquinas's account sheds light on
contemporary attempts to find some intermediate between Cartesian dualism and eliminative materialism.

Aquinas's rejection of Cartesian dualism
In building his alternative to a Cartesian sort of dualism, Aquinas is
guided by two complex, culturally conditioned sets of intuitions, each of
which can be conveniently summed up by a biblical passage. The first is
God's speech to fallen Adam, which Aquinas takes to apply to all subsequent human beings: "dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return"
(Gen. 3:19). The second is the line of Ecclesiastes about human beings at
the moment of death: "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and
the spirit shall return to God who gave it" (Eccles.12:7). On the first set of
intuitions, a human being is a material object, made out of the same sort of
constituents as the earth is, and subject to dissolution by having those constituents resolved back into earth. On the second set of intuitions, a human
person survives death, whatever may happen to her body, because her
spirit or soul continues to exist after the dissolution of her body. Aquinas
thinks he can accommodate both these sets of intuitions with his account of
the human soul.
As is well known, Aquinas takes the soul to be the form of the body.
What is much harder to grasp is what he means by this claim. It may help
to begin by seeing the depth of his commitment to the view that human
beings are material objects and the vehemence with which he rejects
Cartesian dualism.
The position we commonly refer to as 'Cartesian dualism' Aquinas associates with Plato and thinks of as Platonism's account of the soul. So, for
example, he says,
"[if the Platonists were right that a human being is a soul using a
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body], then when the impediment of the body is removed, the
soul would return to its own nature, so that it could understand
intelligible things simply ... as the angels do. But on this view the
soul wouldn't be united to the body for the good of the soul,
because on this view a soul united to a body would understand
less well than when it is separated from the body ... and this position is irrational."2
Elsewhere he says,
"Plato claimed that a human being is not a composite of soul and
body but that a human being is the soul itself using a body, just as
Peter is not a composite of a human being and clothes, but rather a
human being using clothes. But this position is shown to be
impossible. For an animal and a human being are natural, senseperceptible things. But this would not be the case if a body and its
parts did not belong to the essence of a human being and of an
animal. Instead, on Plato's view, the whole essence of both a
human being and an animal would be the soul, although the soul
isn't anything sense-perceptible or material. And for this reason it
is impossible that [something that is] a human being and an animal be a soul using a body.'"
Furthermore, Aquinas shares a common contemporary complaint
against Cartesian dualism; Aquinas, too, thinks that this dualism will have
difficulty explaining the interaction between soul and body. The
Platonists, he says, think that the soul is united to the body through some
intermediary because diverse, distinct substances cannot be bound together unless something unites them. And so certain Platonists postulate one
or another spirit or humor as the medium between soul and body. But
none of these bizarre devices is necessary, Aquinas says, if the soul is
understood as the form of the body.4
It is clear, then, that Aquinas recognizes a position very similar to, if not
identical with, Cartesian dualism, and that he rejects it unconditionally.
His emphatic repudiation of Cartesian dualism should be kept in mind as
we consider his own position.

Aquinas on form: form as configuring
Because he takes the soul to be the form of the body and because of the
focus on form in his account, it will also be helpful to say something briefly
about Aquinas's views of form.
Although Aquinas thinks that not all forms are forms of material
objects, nevertheless on his view all material things are composites of matter and form. Human beings, earthworms, daisies, rocking chairs,
amethyst clumps, and bread dough share with all other material things the
characteristic of having both matter and form. 'Matter' in this distinction
between matter and form is an equivocal term, however. It can be used to
refer either to what is itself a composite of matter and form or to what is

508

Faith and Philosophy

material but entirely formless. Understood in the second way, as formless
matter, it is, of course, "prime" matter, something that exists only in potentiality or in concept. (On Aquinas's view, anything material that exists
actually, rather than merely potentially, will be a composite of matter and
form.) A material composite itself is considered as just matter when that
composite serves as a component - as the matter - for some other composite which has a form of its own. For Aquinas, most material objects can
be conceptually divided into an ordered series of matter-form composites.
A typical medieval example given to illustrate the matter I form distinction is a bronze statue, but for our purposes here it will be more helpful to
take a contemporary example. So consider the protein called
'CAT I Enhancer-Binding Protein' (C/EBP), one of the proteins known to
play an important role in regulating gene expression. In its active form, the
molecule is a dimer with an alpha helix coil. On Aquinas's way of thinking
about material objects, the form of C/EBP is the configuration of the dimer,
including the alpha helix coil; and the dimer subunits constitute the matter.
Of course, each dimer subunit is itself a composite. The form of the subunit is
the configuration of its amino acids, in which, for example, in one region
every seventh spot must be occupied by leucine; and the amino acids composing the subunit are its matter. Amino acids themselves are also clearly
composites, however. The matter of an amino acid such as leucine is the carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen of which it is composed, and the fonn
is the way that material is combined, including the characteristic NH2 configuration common to all the amino acids and the sequence of carbon and
hydrogen peculiar to leucine. We can evidently go on in this way until we
come, for example, to the proton of a hydrogen atom. The quarks that compose it are its matter, and their configuration - the right combination of and
interactions between up and down quarks - is the form of the proton. The
point at which this conceptual decomposition into matter and form has to
quit comes when what counts as the matter isn't itself a composite of matter
and form anymore, that is, at the point at which we reach prime matter,
when matter is conceptually stripped of all its forms.s
In this example, we have been considering only what Aquinas would call
'substantial forms'. These are the forms in virtue of which a material composite is a member of the species to which it belongs. Nahlral material
objects belong to a particular natural kind in virtue of the substantial form
they have; and all material objects have the essence they have, or are what
they are essentially, in virtue of their substantial form. The soul is the substantial form of a human being, the form in virtue of which the matter
informed by it (that is, the matter-form composite) constitutes a living
human body. The soul on Aquinas's account can therefore seem to be a universal, instantiable in more than one.
Aquinas, however, takes the soul to be a particular, not a universal. How
Aquinas's account is to be interpreted on this score and whether it has the
resources to explain a substantial form's being a particular I will leave to a
subsequent section of the paper." What is worth noticing here is that on
Aquinas's account the soul not only is the form that makes this matter a living human body but also is the form that makes the matter this human
being. At any rate, when all that is left of a human being after death is the
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soul, individuality persists on Aquinas's account.
Finally, Aquinas also recognizes accidental forms, forms in virtue of
which a thing has the accidents it has, such as a particular color or a certain
size. Whether a person is stooped or straight-backed, educated or illiterate,
is a matter of accidental forms. Accidental forms aren't a large part of
Aquinas's account of the nature of the soul, however, and so I will say very
little about them here.
It should be clear that it is a mistake to identify form in general simply
with shape. In general, the form (the substantial and accidental forms
taken together) of a material object is the arrangement of the matter of that
object in such a way that it constitutes that object rather than some other
one. This arrangement will commonly be a function not only of the shape
of the matter, but also of the properties of the material parts and the ways
those parts relate causally to each other. Form for Aquinas is not static
but dynamic, something that includes the functioning of and the causal
interactions among the parts. That is why he thinks that when we use the
names of the living body and its parts for the dead body and its parts, we
use those words equivocally. Once a human being dies and the soul is
gone, he says, we use such words as 'flesh' or 'eye' equivocally if we
apply them to the corpse.? At death, the soul is replaced with a different,
non-animating substantial form. The matter of the body is then configured
in a substantially different way and so has a form different from the one it
had before death.' That is why the body can be called 'a human body'
only equivocally even immediately after death. If Aquinas took form to be
simply shape, however, or some other static set of characteristics, then he
would take the eye of the corpse to have the same form it did when the
body was living. That he supposes there to be a complete change of form
at death shows that dynamic interactions among the material parts of a
thing are an important element of the form, on his view.
Finally, unlike some of his contemporaries, Aquinas thought that any
given material object has only one substantial form."' That is, C/EBP does
not have one substantial form in virtue of which it is a dimer, another in
virtue of which it is a protein, another in virtue of which it is a compound
of nitrogen, hydrogen, oxygen, and carbon, and so on. On Aquinas's view,
there is just one substantial form for C/EBP which makes it the kind of
molecule it is, a dimer of amino acid subunits composed of certain elements related to one another in particular ways and themselves comprised
of other components ordered in particular ways. When Aquinas says that
the soul is the form of the body, he means that it is the single, substantial
form of the bodv.
On the basi; of this brief consideration of Aquinas's views of forms,
including the form that is the soul, it seems not unreasonable to think that
by 'form' Aquinas means an essentially configurational state. lO In general,
a substantial form is the configurational state of something that makes it a
member of the kind or species to which it belongs. In the case of a human
being, the substantial form is the divinely created configurational state of
the matter constituting the body which makes that matter not only a
human body but in fact this living human body, capable of human action
and operation, including cognitive function.
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Matter configured by forlll
Before looking in more detail at Aquinas's account of the soul, it may be
helpful to reflect on the nature of his account of material objects in general.
On Aquinas's view, as we increase complexity in systems, even systems
of inanimate things, properties emerge which are properties of the system
but not properties of the material parts of the system. C/EBP, for example,
has the property of being able to regulate genes, and it has this property
because the shape of the molecule as a whole allows it to track the major
groove of the helix of DNA and so bind to it in a way crucial for gene regulation. If the protein were denatured, so that it retained its constituents but
no longer had the same shape, it would no longer be able to regulate genes.
There are many other such examples in nature. The normal prion protein
differs from the disease-causing prion protein in virtually no respect except
the three-dimensional arrangement of the molecule. But normal prion protein is an innocuous part of ordinary neurons, while the differently structured prion protein can afflict brains with spongiform degeneration. II
Now the shape of a molecule results from the configuration of the components of the molecule, from their chemical and physical properties and the
biochemical processes by which they causally interact with each other. The
shape of the molecule is thus not just a sum of the shapes of the parts of
that molecule; rather, the shape is an emergent property of the molecule as
a whole.12 On Aquinas's account, the fact that material objects are composites of matter and form means that material objects can have emergent
properties of this sort, and these emergent properties may bring with them
further emergent properties, such as causal potentialities which belong to
the whole but not to its parts.
(There are, of course, different understandings of the notion of emergent
property.ll Here I am using 'emergent' in Searle's sense, in which a property is emergent in case it is a feature or property of a whole or system, is not
a property of the parts of that system, and can be explained in terms of the
properties of the parts of the system and the causal interactions among the
parts. 14 C/EBP may also, however, exemplify what Searle calls "a much
more adventurous conception" of emergence, in which a feature of the
whole system can't be explained just in terms of the properties of the individual parts of the system and the causal interactions among those parts."
In virtue of its shape (which is a feature of the whole system), C/EBP has
the causal power to regulate genes (itself another feature of the whole system). But, for some large proteins, the shape of the biologically active molecule doesn't result just from the properties and causal interactions among
the atoms that constitute the molecule"'; and knowing the molecule's constituent atoms and the way those atoms can interact with one another is
not enough to explain or predict the shape of the biologically active molecule. That is because the shape is produced by the interaction of the atoms
of the molecule with enzymes that catalyze folding. 17 In that sort of case,
the feature of being able to regulate genes would be emergent in Searle's
"more adventurous" sense of 'emergent'.")
Furthermore, although accounts of emergentism are typically couched
in terms of emergent properties, on Aquinas's way of thinking about mate-
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rial objects what can emerge when form is imposed on matter is not just
properties but substances. When material components are combined into
something higher-level with a particular configuration, a substance will
come into being.'C) Aquinas's account is thus anti-reductionistic. 20 It isn't
true on his account that a material whole is nothing but its material parts or
is identical to its material components." Given his views, it also won't be
true that macrolevel features of the whole can always be explained entirely
in terms of the microlevel properties and relations of the parts. The configuration of the microlevel components isn't itself a micro level property and
in certain cases can't be explained solely on the basis of the components'
properties and interactions with one another. Nonetheless, the configuration will sometimes confer features such as causal powers on the whole
system which are not shared by the components of the system.

The soul as configuring matter
With this much clarification of Aquinas's account behind us, we are in a
position to look further at what he has to say about the soul. 'Soul' is
Aquinas's generic term for the substantial forms of material objects that are
living. On his use of the term, then, plants have souls, too, not in the sense
that they enjoy being talked to or in the sense that they may be reincarnated as something higher up the ladder of being in the next life, but only in
the sense that plants are living things. On his view, a plant has a soul in
virtue of the fact that it has a configuration of matter which allows for
nutrition, growth, reproduction, and the other sorts of activities common
to living things. Animals have souls, since they, too, are living things; but
the configuration of their matter allows them an operation not possible for
plants, namely, perception. The forms that constitute human beings allow
for a still further set of operations, namely, intellective processes.
Because the human soul has this distinctive set of capacities, Aquinas
tends to call it 'the intellective soul', or 'the rational soul' to distinguish it
from the nutritive soul of plants and the sensitive (i.e., capable of perception) soul of animals generally. The intellective soul is that configuration
on the basis of which something exists as this living human body. There
isn't a configuration of matter that makes the body a human body and then
another configuration that is the intellective soul, Aquinas says: "There is
no other substantial form in human beings apart from the intellective
soul" .22 In virtue of this one form, a human being exists as an actual being,
as a material object, as a living thing, as an animal, and as a human being
with cognitive capacities. 23 For this reason, Aquinas tends also to call the
soul the act of the body, because it is in virtue of the soul that something is
actually a living human body.24
Since he takes the soul to be a kind of form and since he thinks of forms
as essentially configurational states, Aquinas holds that the soul is immaterial. The immateriality of the soul is thus for him a direct consequence of
his view of the soul as a form.2; Similarly, he takes the soul to be simple in
virtue of its being an essence or nature. A soul is not simple in the way a
point is,'" Aquinas says; rather it is simple just in the sense that it is not the
sort of thing that has a certain quantity.2? On the other hand, considered
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with respect to what it effects rather than with respect to what it is - that
is, in its powers or operations- the soul is manifold rather than simple,
and the various parts of the body are configured by it in differing ways.2K
Because the soul is the form of the body, it has a spatial location; while
the body is alive, the soul is located where the body is. 29 Aquinas's views
on this point are somewhat complicated. We can take the form of the body
to be a whole in various ways, he says. Considered with regard to the
wholeness of essence, for instance, the whole soul is entirely in each part of
the body, just as whiteness is entirely in each part of a completely white
thing. We can also, however, consider a thing whole with respect to its
operations. Considered just with regard to wholeness of operation, the
whole soul is not in each part of the body, since the operations of the soul
are localized in various parts of the body, as, for example, sight is (on his
view) localized in the eyes.
Some operations, such as intellect and will, are not localized in any
particular organ of the body, he thinks,'" although he does take it on
medical authority that a lower-level cognitive faculty (which he calls
'particular reason') is located in the brain. 31 Nonetheless, he does not
hold, as Descartes apparently did, that higher cognitive functions occur
only in the soul and not in the body. On the contrary, Aquinas thinks
that there is something misleading about attributing cognitive functions
just to the soul itself. Rather, even such higher cognitive functions as
understanding are to be attributed to the whole material composite that
is the human being. "We can say that the soul understands," he says, "in
the same way that we can say that the eye sees; but it would be more
appropriate to say that a human being understands by means of the soul."'2
And he specifically identifies the intellect itself with the form of the
body: lithe intellect, which is the source of intellective function, is the
form of the human body."'3
Finally, as his rejection of a Cartesian sort of dualism has made clear,
Aquinas does not identify a human being with his soul." Instead, it is
his view that "a human being is not a soul only but rather a composite
of soul and body.!!35 There is something redundant about this description of the composite since Aquinas thinks that there is a living human
body only when matter is configured by the form that is the soul. 3n
Given his view that the soul is the single substantial form of a living
human body, we would expect him to say instead that a human being is
a composite of matter and soul, not body and soul. Nonetheless, 'body
and soul' is a common Thomistic description of the material composite
that a human being is. It may be that the problem here is an artifact of
translation; in some contexts, the Latin word translated 'body' ('corpus')
refers just to matter.37
At this point, it is easy to see how Aquinas's account fits the first set of
intuitions that I said shapes it, namely, that human beings are dust and will
return to dust. But it isn't at all easy to see how his account can accommodate the second set of intuitions, namely, that at death the human soul
doesn't cease to exist when the composite of soul and body disintegrates,
that there is an afterlife in which the disembodied soul persists.
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Aquinas on form: form as configured
In fact, at this point, we may think that Aquinas's account can't accommodate the claim that souls persist and engage in mental acts after the
death of the body.
In the first place, if the separated soul is an essentially configurational
state, what is it a state of? Aquinas isn't a universal hylomorphist; he doesn't think that there is a sort of ghostly ectoplasm that can be configured by
the forms of immaterial things, such as souls or angels. And so when he
claims that the separated soul exists apart from the body, he seems to be
holding the peculiar and perplexing view that there can be an essentially
configurational state with nothing that is configured. Secondly, Aquinas
thinks that the separated soul engages in mental acts. But an essentially
configurational state isn't the sort of thing that engages in acts of any sort,
and so it seems that even if there were some way to explain the existence of
the soul apart from the body, there is no possibility that the separated soul
can engage in any actions.
These questions wouldn't have surprised Aquinas. In his work, he confronts objectors making similar points. If the human soul is the form of the
body, then it must be the case that it depends on the body for existence. But
what depends on something else for existence, the objector protests, isn't a
this and can't exist on its own; consequently, neither can the soul, if it is the
form of the body." Elsewhere Aquinas also considers this objection: "forms
dependent on matter as regards being don't have being themselves, strictly
speaking; rather, the composites have being through the forms."',)
Therefore, the objection implies, the soul, which is the form of the body, has
its being only in the being of the body and can't exist or act apart from it.
In my view, these perplexities stem, at least in part, from too limited a
view of what Aquinas has in mind with the notion of form; they result
from focusing on form only in matter-form composites. Something more
needs to be said therefore about Aquinas's views of form.
On Aquinas's view, to be is to be configured or to have a form, and
everything is what it is in virtue of a form. So a broader way to understand
his view of form is this. Weare inclined to suppose that there is something
about matter itself which allows it to be configured. (Or perhaps we are so
familiar and comfortable with the notion of configurations of matter that
we don't suppose matter's ability to be configured requires any explanation.) But for Aquinas the ability of matter to be configured is just a consequence of the fact that matter has being, and what is fundamentally configured is not matter but being.
It was Augustine's view that being is a matter of having order, species,
and mode, and Aquinas adopts and develops this Augustinian idea. An
angel, for Aquinas, is immaterial but configured since it has order and
species, that is, since it is a kind of thing with one rather than another set of
characteristics. Anything that has being - whether that thing is material
or immaterial- will be like this. So just in virtue of being it will have configuration or form. Understanding this point helps to explain why
although Aquinas is perfectly content to deny matter of God, he refuses to
deny form of God: being, even divine being, is being configured.

514

Faith and Philosophy

This broader understanding of form is useful for the problems under
consideration, because it introduces an ambiguity into the notion of form.""
There are forms, such as the form of C/EBP, which are forms in the sense
that they give a configuration to something. And then there are forms that
don't configure something else but that are rather themselves configured.
On Aquinas's view, angels are forms in this latter sense. They are immaterial substances with order, species, and mode, but without matter; and
Aquinas takes them to be forms existing and operating without matter. 41
There is nothing incoherent about the notion of an immaterial substance
that has one rather than another set of characteristics and that exists and
engages in actions of some sort. God and angels are forms in this sense. 42
It is possible, then, for there to be forms that exist apart from matter and
engage in actions, when we understand form in this broader sense, as what
is itself ordered or configured in a certain way, rather than configuring.
But now the problem seems to be that on Aquinas's view the human
soul at death must undergo a fairly radical transformation, from being a
configuring form to being a configured form. If we think, roughly, of
forms in the first sense as properties and forms in the second sense as substances, then it seems as if the soul on Aquinas's account has to jump categories at death; and a transformation of that sort will seem to many
philosophers to be not just radical but impossible.

Aquinas 011 form: configured configurers
Here it is helpful to recognize that it is possible for something to be both
configured and a configurer of other things. This is so, in familiar and
unproblematic ways, as regards material objects. So, for example, C/EBP
is configured, in the ways explained in detail above. But it is also a configurer. When it is bound in the right way to DNA, it helps to unravel the
DNA molecule, thereby reconfiguring the DNA in such a way as to make
transcription possible. Furthermore, before it is bound to DNA, C/ EBP
isn't configuring anything; it's just itseIf configured. Nonetheless, it doesn't undergo any radical transformation, or hop any categories, when it
changes from being unbound to DNA and non-configuring to being bound
and configuring. C/EBP was all along a configured configurer, a configured molecule with a capacity to configure other molecules, and its nature
doesn't change when it exercises that capacity.
Analogous things can be said about the human soul on Aquinas's
viewY For Aquinas, the metaphysical world is ordered in such a way that
at the top of the metaphysical hierarchy there are forms - God and the
angels - which are configured but which aren't configurational constituents of anything else. These forms are configured but non-configuring.
Near the bottom of the hierarchy are forms that configure matter but don't
exist as configured things in their own right. The form of an amethyst is
like this. Such forms are configuring but non-configured. And in the middle are human souls, the amphibians of this metaphysical world, occupying a niche in both the material and the spiritual realm. Like the angels,
the human soul is itself configured; but like the forms of other material
things, the human soul has the ability to configure matter. The human
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soul, then, is a configured configurer. Consequently, in the transition from
configuring matter to not configuring matter, the human soul doesn't
undergo any radical metaphysical transformation or category switching,
any more than the molecule C/EBP does when it goes from not configuring to configuring DNA. It remains what it always was, something configured with an ability to configure other things.
Understanding the soul in this way helps to explain some of the puzzling things Aquinas says about it.
For example, Aquinas takes the forms of material objects generally to
come into existence with the existence of their composites; and although
God is the ultimate or remote cause of the existence of such forms, the
proximate cause is just the cause that brings about the existence of the composite. After canvassing various opinions about the forms of material
objects that he takes to be mistaken, Aquinas summarizes the flaws of
those opinions in this way:
"All these [mistaken] opinions seem to have developed from a
common root, because they were all seeking a cause for forms as if
the forms themselves came into being in their own right. But, as
Aristotle shows, what comes into being, properly speaking, is the
composite. Now the forms of things that are corruptible sometimes exist and sometimes don't exist, without its being the case
that they themselves are generated or corrupted; rather the composites are generated or corrupted ... , So since like comes to be
from like, we should not seek some immaterial form as the cause
of corporeal forms, but rather some composite .... In this way, then,
corporeal forms are caused not as infused from some immaterial
form but as matter is brought from potentiality to actuality by
some composite agent."44
But in this regard the human soul is different from all other forms that
configure matter. It is created directly by God and infused into matter. This
is what we might expect once we know that the soul is configured, as the
angels are; the angels, too, are created directly by God. On the other hand,
however, Aquinas rejects vehemently the notion that the soul can be created
before the body and then infused into an already existent body. He says,
"if the soul is united to the body as its form and is naturally part of
human nature, then it is completely impossible [for the soul to be
created before the body] .... Since the soul is a part of human
nature, it doesn't have its natural perfection unless it is united to
the body. And so it would not have been fitting to create the soul
without the body .... ""
That is why, he says, the soul is created in the body, and souls are produced simultaneously with human bodies"h, at the culmination of human
generationY He is willing to maintain this position even in the face of what
seem to be religiously worrisome objections. Aquinas imagines an objector
asking about children produced by adultery. If the divinely created
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human soul comes into existence only simultaneously with the body of
which it is the form, and if some children are the product of adulterous
liaisons, won't God be concurring in the sin of adultery? God does concur
in the action of the adulterer in such a case, Aquinas says, insofar as that
action is natural and therefore good; God fails to concur only with what is
evil in the action. 4p
Because the form that is the human soul is a configured configurer, it
thus has a double aspect. On the one hand, unlike the forms of other material objects, the soul is created by God, as an individual thing in its own
right, with its own configuration. On the other hand, like the form of any
material object, it exists in the composite it configures, and it comes into
existence only with that composite, not before it.
On this way of understanding the form that is the human soul, it is also
easier to see why Aquinas thinks that the soul makes matter be not just
human but also this human being. The soul itself is an individual configured form, and each soul is as it were handcrafted by God. Aquinas says,
"everything has its being and its individuation from the same
source .... Therefore, as the being of the soul is from God as from
an active principle, ... so also the individuation of the soul, even if
it has a certain relationship to the body, doesn't perish when the
body perishes."49
Given this double aspect of the soul, it's not surprising that Aquinas supposes that the individuality of the person persists after death in the separated soul. Not only is there continuity of cognitive and conative faculties
between the material object that is the human being and the separated
soul; but the separated soul, as a configured form, is what makes a human
being this particular individual.
Finally, this view of the human form helps to alleviate some of the problems thought to be raised by the notion of the resurrection of the body. On
Aquinas's view of the soul, there is mental continuity between a human
person before death and the resurrected human person. Moreover, since
the soul was what made matter this human being, presumably in the resurrection of the body it will again make the matter it informs this human
being. Preservation of identity will not have to be guaranteed by recomposing the human being of the identical atoms as before, and puzzles
about what happens when the same atoms have been part of more than
one human being are avoided.
Aquinas's view here has something in common with Sydney
Shoemaker's views of human persons. Shoemaker thinks that it is possible
for there to be a brain-state transfer device which transfers a person's brain
states from one body to another and thereby preserves an individual person in being through a succession of bodies. Shoemaker's brain states are
presumably configurational states, since there is an interval, however
small, in which the states are in the process of being transferred and so are
no longer in the first body and not yet in the second,s° and yet the states
don't go out of existence in this interval. On Aquinas's view, the interval
may be much longer, and in that interval the configurational state can con-
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tinue to operate, since it is itself something configured. Nonetheless, on
both Aquinas's account and Shoemaker's, the imposition of the configurational state on new matter preserves the identity of the person. 51

Cartesian dualism redivivus?
At this point it may seem that this interpretation of Aquinas's account
has rescued it from some pressing problems only to enmesh it in all the
equally difficult problems of Cartesian dualism, and that Aquinas has after
all succumbed to the Platonic dualism from which he was so concerned to
dissociate his own views. As I have explained Aquinas's account of the
soul, doesn't it collapse into Cartesian or Platonic dualism? Isn't Aquinas's
view just another version of the ghost in the machine?
Here, I think, the answer is clearly 'no', and for reasons that are in a
sense two sides of the same coin. On Cartesian dualism, (1) both the soul
and the body are substances in their own right. Each can engage in acts
independently of the other, and each can causally effect the other.
Together soul and body make up a human being, but (2) the soul is a separate integral part of a human being, as a roof is a separate integral part of a
house. That's why thinking can go on in the soul, but not be in the body at
the same time. On Aquinas's account, both (1) and (2) are false.
In the first place, although for Aquinas the separated soul exists on its
own after death, it nonetheless isn't a substance in its own right. Aquinas
distinguishes two kinds of things that can exist on their own, those that are
complete substances and those that just subsist, that is, that exist on their
own but are not complete substances. A hand 52 or a partially built but
incomplete house is a subsistent thing in this latter sense, C, and so is the
soul. "Not every particular substance is a hypostasis or a person," he says,
"but [only] that which has the complete nature of the species. So a hand or
a foot cannot be called a hypostasis or a person, and similarly, neither can
the soul, since it is [only] a part" of a complete human being. 54 And so
Aquinas says both that
"Intellectual natures are subsistent forms, and although they exist
in matter, their being does not depend on matter"SS
and that
''body and soul are not two actually existing substances; instead,
one actually existing substance arises from these two."'"
The soul is therefore just a part, although a subsistent part, of the substance
that is a human being.57
It isn't, however, an integral part of a human being. If we think of integral parts as components that together compose a material whole,'" as a
roof is a part of a house and a head is part of a body, then no forms are
integral parts of the material objects to which they belong. When Aquinas
lists the parts of a house, he tends to list such things as foundation, walls,
and roof; he wouldn't add the form of the house as one more item on the
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list59 • On the other hand, when we think of the constitution of a material
object such as C/EBP, then an important part of what we consider is the
configuration in which its component molecules and atoms are organized.
There can be metaphysical, as well as integral, parts, in some extended
sense of 'part'; and a form is a part of a whole only in such an extended
sense. As a part of this sort, the form couldn't interact causally with the
matter it informs. The form has causal influence in the sense that the composite has the causal influence it does because of its form. But it makes no
sense to think, for example, of the configuration of C/EBP interacting
causally with the matter of C/EBP.
So Aquinas rejects both (1) and (2), which are characteristic of Cartesian
dualism, and he does so because he takes the soul to be a configured configurer. Because the soul is something configured, it is a subsistent thing.
But because it is a configurer of matter, it isn't a complete substance in its
own right, and it isn't even an integral part of a complete substance. For
that reason, the body exercises efficient causality in virtue of the soul, but
the soul doesn't exercise efficient causality on the matter it informs. As far
as that goes, the matter it informs couldn't exercise efficient causality on
the soul either; the matter can engage in causal interactions only in virtue
of being configured as it is, that is, in virtue of the soul.
We can sum up the differences between Descartes and Aquinas by saying
that Descartes, unlike Aquinas, sees the soul only as configured, and not also
as a configurer; Descartes's soul doesn't inform matter to constitute a body.
In consequence of this difference, Aquinas's account is not vulnerable to the
two main problems thought to afflict Cartesian dualism, namely, that it can't
explain the nature of the causal interaction between soul and body and that
it divides cognitive functions into those that can be implemented only in the
soul and those that can be implemented only in the body. On Aquinas's
account, there is no efficient causal interaction between the soul and the matter it informs, and all cognitive functions can be implemented in the body.

Dust and spirit
Does Aquinas then succeed in reconciling the two sets of intuitions I
said earlier guided his account of the soul, namely, that human beings are
composed of dust and return to it, and that at death the spirit returns to
God who gave it? The answer, I think, is 'yes'.
Since Aquinas thinks of a human being as a composite of matter and
soul and since he recognizes that dead human bodies decay, he does in fact
believe that a human being falls apart at death. The disembodied soul
which persists is not the complete human being who was the composite
but only a part of that human being.60 In response to the question whether
the saints in heaven can pray for us, an objector says, "the soul of Peter
isn't Peter. So if the souls of the saints pray for us when they are separated
from the body, we ought not to call on 5t. Peter to pray for us but rather on
the soul of 5t. Peter" Aquinas's reply is to grant the point that the soul is
not the complete human being but to argue for the appropriateness of calling the part (the soul) by the name of the whole (the composite of matter
and form that Peter was and will be).6J
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The disembodied soul after death is consequently something like the
mirror image of a human being who is in a persistent vegetative state. A
human being in an irreversible vegetative state is an incomplete human
being. So, in a very different sense, is a disembodied soul, on Aquinas's
view. When the soul of a person is separated from the body, Aquinas
thinks, the cognitive powers that person had are curtailed and restricted;
and, for certain cognitive functions, Aquinas feels constrained to give complicated considerations to show how the disembodied soul could engage in
them at all "2. As for knowledge of material things in the world that would
ordinarily be cognized with sense perception, Aquinas attributes the disembodied soul's ability to cognize such things to divine intervention.b3
Aquinas holds that disembodied existence isn't natural to the soul. If it
weren't for the miserableness of the fallen human condition, which includes
the necessity of dying - that is, the separation of soul and body - the soul
would never exist in a disembodied state. 64 Furthermore, the soul's existence in a disembodied state is an impermanent as well as an unnatural condition. It is contrary to the nature of the soul to be without the body,
Aquinas says, and nothing contrary to nature can be perpetual.
Consequently, the soul's separation from the body cannot last."' In the general resurrection of the dead, at the last judgment, souls will be reimbodied.
Except for the interim period, human persons in the afterlife wiII be like
human persons in this life, in the sense that they will be material composites
of matter and form. After the period of disembodied existence, the soul will
again exist as a constituent of a body, as it did before death."" Nevertheless,
although existence apart from the body isn't natural to the soul, and
although the soul as the form of the body isn't itself a complete substance,
on Aquinas's view it is possible for the soul to exist apart from the body
and, with divine help, to engage in cognitive functions in that condition.
For these reasons Aquinas can accept the claim that at death the spirit
returns to God who made it. Given the way he understands this claim,
however, it turns out after all not to be incompatible with the claim that
human beings are dust.
To sum up, then, the soul is an essentially configurational state which is
immaterial and subsistent, able to exist on its own apart from the body. On
the other hand, the soul is the form that makes the living human body
what it is. While it is possible with divine help for the soul to exist and
exercise cognitive function on its own, apart from the body, that state is
unnatural to it. In the natural condition, human cognitive functions are to
be attributed to the whole composite and not to the soul alone, although
the composite exercises cognitive functions by means of the soul.
Mental properties are emergent, on this view, insofar as they are features which are dependent on the configuration and composition of the
whole; they are not identical to the properties of the material parts of the
whole, but they emerge from the properties and dynamic interactions of
those parts. The intellective soul is essentially configurational, but in its
natural state it is a configuration of matter. If we can understand the intellective part of the human soul as roughly equivalent to the mind, then for
Aquinas the mind is immaterial but implemented (in its natural condition)
in matter. A human being, who is a composite of matter and form, can
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engage in cognitive functions in virtue of his form, the soul; but in the natural condition, it is the whole composite and not the soul alone that understands and cognizes and the rest."; Would Aquinas think that the mind is
identical to the brain if he had known enough neuroscience? Given what
he says about the separated soul, the answer, of course, has to be 'no'. But
even if we ask just about the mind before death, in its natural, embodied
state, it seems less misleading to say that he would have thought that the
mind emerges from the functioning of the brain, since the human form on
his account is dynamic rather than static.

Taxonomy: Materialism without Reductionism
How are we to understand Aquinas's account? It is clear that he rejects
the Cartesian sort of dualism. On the other hand, Aquinas seems clearly
in the dualist camp somewhere since he thinks that there is an immaterial
and subsistent constituent to the subject of cognitive function.
What sort of dualist is he? Since the forms of material objects in general
don't exist on their own and since the soul isn't a complete substance, we
might think he should be classified just as some sort of property dualist.
He does, however, hold that the soul can exist without the body, and his
position is thus stronger than ordinary property dualisms. Perhaps we
should invent a new genus subsistence dllalism, under which substance dualism will be one species and Aquinas'S account of the soul another. But perhaps we need not be so fussy. It is clear that Aquinas's account of the soul
is more nearly allied with substance dualism than with property dualism;
and if we don't take 'substance' in 'substance dualism' too strictly (if it can
include subsistent things that aren't complete substances), then we can
count Aquinas among the substance dualists. 6S In that case, we ought to
categorize Aquinas as a non-Cartesian substance dualist and put him in the
camp of those opposed to physicalism.
Matters are not so simple here, however. Dennett takes it to be characteristic of dualism to hold that the mind is not composed of matter and that
scientific investigation of the brain can't teach us anything about the
mind. 69 Shoemaker thinks that what characterizes dualism is the view that
a person is something distinct from his body and so has any physical states
only derivatively.70 But if Dennett and Shoemaker are right about what
dualism is, then Aquinas shouldn't be counted among the dualists.
Aquinas takes human beings to be matter-form composites, and he attributes cognition to the whole human being: 'We can say that the soul understands in the same way that we can say that the eye sees, but it would be
more appropriate to say that a human being understands by means of the
soul."7! Since on his view the subject that engages in cognition is a material
substance, it will be possible to investigate that subject by the methods for
investigating matter. Furthermore, Patricia Churchland takes it to be one
of the main characteristics of physicalism to hold that "mental states are
implemented in neural stuf£"72. But if this characterization of physicalism;3
is right, Aquinas should apparently be grouped with the physicalists.
Although Aquinas mistakenly supposes that the intellect is tied to no particular bodily organ, he nonetheless holds that the intellectual soul is the
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form constituting the human body as a whole. On his view, therefore,
mental states will be implemented in matter. His account of the soul is consequently compatible with supposing that mental states are implemented
in neural stuff.
At this point it might occur to someone to suppose that it can hardly be
surprising that Aquinas's account of the soul isn't readily assimilable to
either dualism or physicalism; the difficulty in categorizing Aquinas, such
a person might think, stems from trying to insert a peculiarly medieval theory into the contemporary discussion, where it simply won't fit. But I
think this is a mistaken attitude.
Consider, for example, Richard Boyd's recent defense of a functionalist
version of materialism. Boyd argues that, although materialism is sometimes taken to include the claim that mental states are identical to physical
states, materialism is in fact committed just to the claim that the mind is
composed of matter. "Materialism, properly understood, does not entail
the sort of mind-body identity statements against which the essentialist
[i.e., anti-materialist) criticisms are directed", Boyd says.74
To argue for his claim, he distinguishes compositional plasticity from configurational plasticity, in this way: "Compositional plasticity is displayed by
a type of state, event, or process to the extent that there are possible realizations of that state, event, or process that differ in the sorts of substances or
causal factors that constitute them. Configurational plasticity, in contrast, is
displayed by a type of state, event, or process to the extent that its possible
token reahzations differ in the structural configuration or arrangement of
their constituent parts, events, substances, or causal factors."7s
According to Boyd, "mental events, states, and processes are like computational states in being entirely configurational, that is, in possessing
maximal compositional plasticity."76 In fact, on his account, mental events,
states, and processes have no compositional properties essentially. The
occurrence of some mental or psychological states in more than one animal
species shows that mental states shouldn't be identified with physical
states, since it's highly unlikely that other animals share exactly our neurophysiological states; and it's even more unlikely that all logically possible
animals that have some of the same mental states as human beings would
have the same physiological states we do. For that reason as well as others,
Boyd says, "materialism (in its most plausible version) entails that mental
states are purely configurational"77 and not identical with physical states. 7S
Furthermore, on Boyd's view it is possible for mental events, states, and
processes to exist without being realized in any matter at all: 70 "any particular actual world mental event, state, or process could be - in some other
possible world -nonphysically realized."'" Consequently, Boyd says, "A
materialist account of mental phenomena is quite compatible with the
view that there are possible worlds in which mental phenomena exist but
are nonphysical.""' In fact, he maintains, "it is ... fully compatible with a
plausible materialist psychology that there should be a possible world in
which there is no matter at all, but in which there are events, states, and
processes that have all the nonrelational properties essential to the mental
events, states, and processes manifested in the actual world."82 Mental
processes and states must be the processes and states of something, how-
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ever, and so on Boyd's view it must also be logically possible that there be
a mind which is not realized in matter.83
Boyd thinks of himself as supporting materialism, and he calls his position 'materialism without reductionism'. It seems to me, however, that his
position is very similar to (though, of course, not identical with) that of
Aquinas, who is not only a dualist but even a substance dualist (in a liberal
sense of that phrase). Boyd's mental phenomena, like Aquinas's soul, are
purely configurational.R4 Like the soul in Aquinas's account, mental phenomena on Boyd's view have no essential compositional properties. Even
more surprising, both Boyd and Aquinas agree in supposing that it is possible for what is purely configurational to exist on its own apart from any
material composition and to function in that condition. For both of them,
then, it is possible that there be functioning, disembodied mental states.
It is tempting here to suppose that the comparison with Aquinas
shows Boyd is really a dualist in materialist's clothing." On the other
hand, we might construe Aquinas as a materialist with respect to
human beings86 whose metaphysics provides a principled reason for
thinking that reductionism isn't a necessary corollary to materialism.
For Aquinas, material objects are composites of matter and form, and a
composite of matter and form can itself serve as matter for some other,
more complex composite of matter and form. As complexity increases
and new forms are produced in the increasingly complex composites,
new properties as well as new substances will emerge. To reduce the
composite to its constituent matter or to reduce the properties of the
composite to just the properties of the composite's components is to
think that the form of the whole is nothing. But on Aquinas's view the
form of the whole, the configuration that makes the parts into the
whole they compose, is an important ontological feature of the world.
And that is why, on his account, material objects can't be reduced to the
parts that compose them; insofar as events, states, and processes have
material components interacting in certain configurations, the same
point will apply to them.
But I am more inclined to think it makes no sense to try to determine
whether Boyd is really a dualist of some sort or Aquinas is really a nonreductionistic materialist as regards human beings. In my view, the real
lesson of this detailed examination of Aquinas's account of the soul is to
show how misleading the dichotomy between materialism and dualism
is. What Aquinas's account of the soul shows us is that a certain kind of
(restricted rather than global) materialism - one that takes mental states
to be implemented in bodily states - is compatible with a certain sort of
dualism - one that is non-Cartesian in character. To this extent, examination of Aquinas's account supports Searle's claim that it is a mistake to
suppose that one must choose between materialism and dualism. 87
Although Boyd accepts the dichotomy between materialism and dualism and means to choose materialism, something he says in support of
his position helps explain why the dichotomy is misleading or mistaken.
He says, "The issue [between materialism and dualism] ... has come to be
described as the issue of whether the corresponding mental and physical
states are identical [as many materialists have argued] or (as the dualist

DUALISM, MATERIALISM, REDUCTIONISM

523

suggests) merely correlated. ... this way of putting the question is fundamentally misleading. The issue is not identity versus correlation, but
composition versus correlation."" Boyd supposes that correlation is
unsuccessful as an account of mind, and he (like Aquinas) builds his
position around composition. As both Boyd and Aquinas recognize (in
different ways), however, composition has a twofold nature. On
Aquinas's view, composition for material objects requires both matter
and form; on Boyd's view, we can distinguish the configuration of a
composite from the stuff in which that configuration is realized. If we
focus on the material stuff and think that composites are identical with
their material parts, then we are likely to think the mental is identical
with the physical. If we focus on the configuration as the essential feature of the mental, our view will look dualistic. But in fact because the
mind is a complex configuration of a material object, a correct account of
it will share features of both materialism and dualism. Furthermore, the
hybrid nature of composition also helps to explain the strength of the
debate over the nature of the mind. Because the mind is implemented in
a composite and composition is a hybrid of matter and configuration,
both materialist and anti-materialist intuitions can find strong support
from a consideration of the properties and characteristics of the mind.
Aquinas's account, then, helps us see that the battle lines between
dualism and materialism are misdrawn. 89 It is possible to have a coherent
account of the mind that satisfies intuitions of both dualists and materialists. It's unlikely, of course, that everyone will think Aquinas's account of
the soul, including the soul's persistence after death, is coherent. But it is
worth noting here that religious belief isn't necessary for supposing that
the soul can exist and function apart from the body. Boyd, too, thinks it's
clear that there can be mental states, events, and processes even in a
world in which there is no matter at al1. 90 Furthermore, even if we cut out
all of Aquinas'S account that has to do with the afterlife, that is, if we
assume that the soul in his account is just one more immaterial form of a
material object, like the form of C/EBP, which exists only in the composite it helps constitute, Aquinas's account of the mind would nonetheless
have the hybrid nature highlighted here. It would still take the mind to
be something essentially immaterial or configurational but nonetheless
- in human beings - realized in material components. And so it would
still combine features of both dualism and materialism.
Aquinas's account of the soul, therefore, suggests that to make
progress on a philosophical understanding of the nature of the mind (as
distinct from a biological understanding of the mechanisms by which
the mind operates), it would be good to break down the dichotomy
between materialism and dualism that takes them to be incompatible
positions. It also strongly suggests that Cartesian dualism is not essential to all the major traditions of the major monotheisms. For Aquinas,
at any rate, the rejection of Cartesian dualism is entirely compatible
with his view of the nature of the soul."!

St. Louis University

Faith and Philosophy

524

NOTES
1. Meditation VI, in The PhilosophicaL Writings of Descartes, trans. John
Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), vol.II, p.54. In other places, Descartes seems to hold
that a complete human being is a compound of body and soul; see, for example, his reply to objections, in The Philosophical Writings of Dl'scartes, vol.TI,
pp.299-300. How this position is to be reconciled with the position in the quotation from Meditation VI is not entirely clear; but my interest in this paper is only
in the dualism commonly associated with Descartes, regardless of whether or
not Descartes himself actually held it. For discussion of the extent to which
Descartes held Cartesian dualism, see, for example, Margaret Wilson, Descartes,
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,1978), pp.177-185, and Tad Schmaltz,
"Descartes and Malebranche on Mind and Mind-Body Union", The
Philosophical Review 101 (1992) 281-325.
2. Summa theologiae (ST) I q.89 a.1.
3. Summa contra GentiLes (SCG) II. 57.
4. Quaestiones de anima, q.9 corpus.
5. Peter van Inwagen thinks that he differs from Aristotle (and others,
such as Aquinas, who accept the notion of prime matter) because, unlike the
upholders of prime matter, he believes that "matter is ultimately particulate"
(Material Beings, [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990], p.3 and p.15). But
van Inwagen is clearly concerned with actually existing material objects and
their actual ultimate constituents. Aquinas might well agree that the ultimate
actual constituents of a material object are particulate. Prime matter is never an
actual part of anything, and its existence is only potential and conceptual,
never actual. The final division of form from prime matter can occur only in
thought.
6. For arguments that Aquinas's account is not successful in dealing with
problems related to the individuation of the soul, see Swinburne's section in
Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne, Personal Identity, (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1984), p.32. Swinburne seems to me not to take adequate account of
the twofold nature of the soul, as configured as well as configuring, in his
arguments against Aquinas.
7. Quaestiones de anima, q.9 corpus.
8. In Libros de anima L.IJ, 1.1, 226.
9. For a good account of this medieval controversy over substantial forms,
see, for example, Anton Pegis, st. Thomas and the Problem of the Soul in the
Thirteenth Century, (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, reprinted ]983).
10. There is a very helpful discussion of Aristotle's concept of form in
Marjorie Grene's "Aristotle and Modern Biology", Journal of the History of Ideas
33 (1972) 395-424. She argues that Aristotle's concept of form is very like the
contemporary biological concepts of organization or information. I am not convinced that my phrase "configurational state" is the only or even the best way
of conveying the meaning of the Latin 'forma'; Grene's renderings of the equivalent Aristotelian term in terms of organization or information strike me as also
appropriate. (I am grateful to Shawn Floyd for calling Grene's article to my
attention.)
11. Ziwei Huang, Jean-Marc Gabriel, Michael Baldwin, et al., "Proposed
three-dimensional structure for the cellular prion protein", Proceedings of the
National Academy of Sciences, 91 (July 191994) 7139-7143.
12. For a very helpful discussion of the history of the notion of emergent
properties, see Brian McLaughlin, "The Rise and Fall of British Emergentism,"
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in emergence or Reduction? Essays on the Prospects of Nonreductive Physicalism, ed.
Ansgar Beckermann, Hans Flohr, and Jaegwon Kim, (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1992), pp.49-93. (I am grateful to McLaughlin for calling this article to
my attention.)
13. It is interesting to note that in Samuel Alexander's influential early
account of emergent properties, they are identified with configurational patterns and explicitly associated with the historical distinction between matter
and form. Alexander says, "To adopt the ancient distinction of form and matter, the kind of existent from which the new quality emerges is the "matter"
which assumes a certain complexity of configuration and to this pattern or universal corresponds the new emergent quality." (quoted in Timothy O'Connor,
"Emergent Properties", American Philosophical Quarterly 31 (1994) 91-104.
O'Connor's article is a helpful discussion of emergent properties; O'Connor
himself thinks that a sufficiently rich account of emergent properties will constitute a middle road between substance dualism and materialism. As I argue
in what follows, another alternative is to see that a certain sort of materialism
and a certain sort of dualism are not incompatible.) For a useful discussion of
reasons for preferring one formulation of the notion of emergence over another, see Robert L. Klee, "Micro-determinism and Concepts of Emergence",
Philosophy of Science 51 (1984) 44-63.
14. John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press,
1992), p.111.
15. Ibid., p.112.
16. There is some room for ambiguity and confusion here. On some
accounts of emergence, for example, a property of a system is emergent if it
couldn't have been predicted from knowledge of the properties of the parts of
the system or if the microstructure of a system doesn't completely determine
the property in question. But it isn't entirely clear what is to count as the
microstructure of the system or the properties of the parts. In particular, when
we include under the properties of the parts the relations and causal interactions among those parts, we can be thinking of those relations and causal interactions in two ways: (i) as the causal potentialities of the parts, the way in
which (for example) the molecule's constituent atoms, taken individually, are
able to interact with and relate to one another; (ii) as the relations and causal
interactions the parts in fact have in the form of the whole, the way in which
(for example) the constituent atoms interact with one another in the configuration which the molecule has in its final, biologically active form. I am taking
'causal interactions' in sense (i) here. In sense 0), it is true to say, as biochemists
do, that the folded shape of a protein cannot always be derived from even perfect knowledge of the biochemical properties of the components of the protein,
including their causal interactions (since it might be the case that the protein
achieves that folded shape only with the help of enzymes, for example). It
would not be true to say this in sense (ii). If we take 'causal interactions' in
sense (ii), then we smuggle the configuration, or the form of the whole, into the
properties of the parts of the whole. In sense (ii), it would be very surprising if
there were features of the whole system that were not explainable in terms of
or determined by the causal interactions of the parts of the whole, since the features of the system are a function of the configuration of the whole and that
configuration is in effect being counted among the properties of the parts.
17. See, for example, Frederic M. Richards, "The Protein Folding Problem",
Scientific American 264 (Jan. 1991) 54-63. According to Richards, for relatively
small proteins folding is a function of the properties and causal potentialities
among the constituents of the protein, but "some large proteins have recently
been shown to need folding help from other proteins known as chaperonins."
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(p.54) Richards thinks of proteins with 300 or fewer amino acids as small proteins. C/EBP has 359 amino acids, and I don't know enough biochemistry to
know whether or not that size puts C/EBP in the category of small proteins
that need no folding help.
18. Whether such an emergent property of a whole system should be
counted as supervening on the properties of its components depends, in part,
on two things. (The type of supervenience at issue here is what is sometimes
called 'multiple domain supervenience'; see, for example, Jaegwon Kim,
"Supervenience for Multiple Domains", reprinted in Supervenience and Mind,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp.109-130. A helpful formulation of such a supervenience relation with respect to wholes and parts is
given in O'Connor 1994, p.96. ) (1) Whether it is possible for the parts to have
the properties they have without the whole system's having the emergent feature in question depends on what we think is to be included among the properties of the parts and whether the configuration of the whole is somehow
included among them. If we think the properties of the parts include causal
interactions among the parts only in sense (D of note 16 above, then the emergent property will not be supervenient on the properties of the parts, since it is
possible for the parts to exist and have those properties without the whole's
having the emergent property in question - as would be the case, for example, if we synthesized a large protein but didn't succeed in catalyzing its folding, so that it wasn't biologically active. (2) Whether it is possible to have the
systems feature in question exemplified by different constituents with different
properties is at least in part a function of how abstract the description of the
systems feature at issue is. Being able to regulate genes is one thing; being able
to regulate genes by fitting a leucine zipper of such-and-such a size into the
major groove of a DNA helix is another. The intuitive idea behind supervenience is that the supervenient property is dependent upon and determined by
the subvening properties. My point here is that whether or not we have such
dependence and determination in the case of emergent properties depends,
among other things, on whether or not the configuration of the whole is tacitly
included among the properties of the parts and on the specificity with which
we pick out the supervenient property.
19. Giving a principled distinction between configurations of material components that combine their components into one thing from those that bring
the components together without combining them into one thing is difficult.
(For a good account of the problems, see Peter van Inwagen, Material Beings,
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990). It isn't clear to me that Aquinas
has the resources for giving an adequate distinction of this sort, but see, for
example, In libros Metaphysicorum, L. VII, 1.17, 1672 -1674. There Aquinas says
that in cases in which the composite is one thing, the composite is not identical
with its components; rather the composite is something over and above its
components.
20. For a helpful discussion of the general problem of reductionism relevant
to the issues considered here, see Alan Garfinkel, "Reductionism", in The
Philosophy of Science, ed. Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J.D.Trout,
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp443-459. Garfinkel argues against
reductionism by trying to show that reductive microexplanations are often not
sufficient to explain the macrophenomena they are intended to explain and
reduce. He says, "A macrostate, a higher level state of the organization of a
thing, or a state of the social relations between one thing and another can have a
particular realization which, in some sense, "is" that state in this case. But the
explanation of the higher order state will not proceed via the microexplanation
of the microstate which it happens to "be". Instead, the explanation will seek its
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own leveL" (p.449). Aquinas would agree, and Aquinas's account of the relation of matter and form in material objects helps explain Garfinkel's point. The
biological system has a form as well as material constituents, so that the system is
not identical to the constituents alone; and some of the properties of the system
are a consequence of the form of the system as a whole. Garfinkel himself recognizes the aptness of the historical distinction between matter and form for his
argument against reductionism. He says, "the independence of levels of explanation ... can be found in Aristotle's remark that in explanation it is the form and
not the matter that counts." (p.149). See also Philip Kitcher, "1953 and All That: A
Tale of Two Sciences", in Tile Philosophy of Science, op.cit., pp.553-570. Kitcher,
who rejects reductionism in biology, argues for the strongly anti-reductionist
claim that sometimes descriptions of higher-level processes are needed to
explain events at a lower level.
21. For an interesting contemporary argument against the reduction of
wholes to their parts, see Peter van lnwagen, "Composition as Identity", in
James Tomberlin, ed., Phiiosophicill PerspectiI'es, vol. 8, (Atascadero, CA:
Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1994), pp.207-219.
22. ST I q.76 a.4 corpus.
23. ST I q.76 a.6 ad 1.
24. STJ q.75 a.l.
25. ST I q. 75 a.5.
26. For some arguments that the soul is simple in the way that a point is,
see Philip Quinn, "Tiny Selves: Chisholm on the Simplicity of the Soul", forthcoming. I am grateful to Quinn for allowing me to see his paper in typescript.
27. Quaestiones de Ilnimll, q.l0 ad 18.
28. Quaestiones de anima, q.9 ad 14.
29. Aquinas therefore wouldn't agree with Hoffman and Rosencrantz, who
define the soul as lacking a spatial location. See Joshua Hoffman and Gary
Rosencrantz, "Are Souls Unintelligible?", in James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical
Perspectives, vo1.5, (Atascadero, CA: Ridgeview Publishing Co., 1991), p.183.
30. ST I g.76 a.8 corpus. See also the discussion in QUllcstiones de IlniJl1I1, g.lD
corpus and SCC II.72.
31. ST I q.78 a.4 corpus.
32. ST I g.75 a.2 ad 2.
33. ST I q.76 a.1 corpus.
34. Contrast Chisholm here, who uses 'soul' to mean the same thing as
'person'. See Roderick Chisholm, "On the Simplicity of the Soul", in James
Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 5, op.cit., p. 167.
35. ST I q.75 a.4 corpus.
36. The possible identification of human agents that Chisholm quickly dismisses, namely, that a human person is his (living) body, is therefore the one
Aquinas espouses. Chisholm's reasons for rejecting it include his mereological
essentialism and his conviction that a person could lose a part of his body and
still continue to exist. Aquinas shares Chisholm's conviction that a person can
persist through the loss of a part of his substance, but he would not accept
Chisholm's mereological essentialism for human beings. See Roderick Chisholm,
"On the Simplicity of the Soul", in James Tomberlin, ed., Philosophical
Perspcctives, vol. 5, op.cit., p.168.
37. In some versions of the Porphyrian tree in logic texts, for example, 'corpus' is the name for the genus that encompasses all material things, both animate and inanimate.
38. QUllestiones de anima q.l obj.12.
39. SCG U.51.
40. I am grateful to Brian McLaughlin for helping me see the point in this
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paragraph.
41. See, for example, ST I q.50 a.2 ad :3 and a.5.
42. See, for example, ST I q.3 a.2: "Cod is therefore by his essence a form".
43. There are also significant disanalogies between C/EBP and the soul.
Here are some of them. (1) What is a configured configurer in the case of
C/EBP is the matter-form composite; in the case of the soul, it is the form
alone. (2) C/ESP configures something which is a matter-form composite itself;
the soul configures unformed matter. (3) C/EBP is a substance in its own right;
the soul is not. (4) Perhaps because of the difference between C/EBP and the
soul noted in the preceding disanalogy, when C/EBP configures DNA, the
result of the configuration isn't one substance - C/EBP and DNA don't constitute one super-molecule; but the soul and the matter it configures do form
one substance, an individual human being. And there are other disanalogies
as well. In this context, then, C/EBP should be taken just as a heuristic example, designed to make more plausible the notion of a configured configurer. It
shouldn't be taken as strictly exemplary of everything that is true of the soul on
Aquinas's account.
44. ST I q.65 a.4 corpus.
45. ST I q.90 a.4 corpus.
46. The production of a human body isn't itself instantaneous, however;
Aquinas does not think that at conception the fetus is a human being. On his
view, one substantial form succeeds another in the fetus, so that before the
fetus is a human body with a human soul, it is animated by the nutritive soul
and the sensitive soul. See, for example, ST I q.76 a.3 ad 3.
47. ST I q.118 a.2 corpus and a.3 corpus.
48. STI q.118 a. 2 ad 5.
49. Quaestiones de anima, q. 1 a.1 ad 2.
50. Shoemaker gives no indication that he thinks the SST device is personpreserving only in case it transfers brain states instantaneously or that brain
states are such that they can be transferred only if the process of transfer takes
no time.
51. See Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne, Personal Identity,
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp.108-1ll.
52. ST T q.75 a.2 ad 1. It's not entirely clear what Aquinas has in mind with
the distinction between a complete and an incomplete substance, but the idea
seems to be something like this: the definition of an incomplete substance will
include reference to a primary substance, as the definition of a complete substance will not.
53. See Quaestioncs dc anima, q.I corpus and ad 3, and ST I-II q.72 a.2 corpus, where Aquinas says, "things are found to differ in species in two ways, in
one way from the fact that each [of the differing things] has a [different] complete species, as a horse and a cow differ in species, and in another way insofar
as difference in species is found in accordance with difference in the degree of
some generation or motion, as a building is a complete generation of a house,
but the laying of the foundation and the raising of a wall constihlte an incomplete species". See also In Libras de anima L.II, 1.1, 215.
54. ST [ q.75 a.4 ad 2.
55. SCC lI.51.
56. SCC lI.69. Aquinas would therefore share Peter van Inwagen's intuition
that two objects (or substances) cannot be composed of all and only the same
proper parts at the same time (Van Inwagen 1990, p.5). A gold statue and the
gold of which it is made aren't two different actual substances on Aquinas's
view any more than on van Inwagen's. For Aquinas, however, it will be true
that the same proper parts can be parts of more than one object at the same
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time. The matter that makes up a nitrogen atom can be part of that atom, part
of an amino acid, and part of the CjEBP protein at the same time.
57. Swinburne is therefore mistaken in claiming that on Aquinas's view a
soul is itself a substance; see Sydney Shoemaker and Richard Swinburne,
Personal Identity, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984), p.32.
58. These are what Aquinas calls 'integral' parts, as distinct from metaphysical parts.
59. See also In Libras Mdaphysicorul1l L.VII, 1.17, 1679-1680 where Aquinas
explains that the form of a material composite isn't an element of the composite in the way that its material components are; rather the form is what
Aquinas calls a 'principle' of the constitution of the composite.
60. Aquinas would therefore not accept the claim that anything which is
embodied is necessarily embodied. For interesting arguments that the claim
should in fact not be accepted, see Stephen Yablo, "The Real Distinction
Between Mind and Body", The Canadian fOllmal of Philosophy, supplementary
volume 16 (1990), p.197.
61. STII-IT q.83 a.11.
62. Richard Swinburne asserts that on Aquinas's account there is no memory in the separated soul (The Evolution of the Soul, (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
19S6), p.306); but Swinburne is mistaken here. He supports his point by referring to SCC Il.81.14, where Aquinas says that recollection isn't in the separated
soul. But in that passage Aquinas goes on to say that the denial of recollection
in the separated soul is false if by 'recollection' we mean the understanding of
things which the person cognized before (in the embodied state). Whatever
exactly Aquinas means by 'recollection' here, then, it isn't to be equated with
memory in general.
63. ST I q.R9 a.l and a.8.
64. ST I-II q.85, a.5 and a.6.
65. SCC rV.79.
(,6. What are we to say about the human person here? The question is
somewhat difficult to answer just because the contemporary notion of personhood doesn't map neatly on to medieval concepts; certainly the medieval term
'persona' isn't equi"valent to our 'person'. As far as r can see, Aquinas's notion
of a human being is as close to our notion of person as anything else in his
account of human nature. If this is right, then for Aquinas the person, as it
were, falls apart at death. Nonetheless, although the soul is just a part of a person, it is the part that has intellect and will, so that there is a sense in which, on
his account, the person survives death, since the person part that is the soul
thinks and wills even if it isn't a complete person in its own right. (This is no
doubt at least part of the reason why he thinks it is appropriate to call the soul
of Peter 'Peter', as he claims we should do in his discussion of prayer to the
saints in heaven.) In this sense, the soul is different from other forms of materialobjects. The form of a cathedral without the matter it configures might be
considered a part of the cathedral, in some sense of part, but even if the form
somehow survived the dissolution of the form-matter composite that is the
cathedral, ordinarily we wouldn't think the survival of this part of the cathedral counted as the survival of the cathedral. (I say 'ordinarily' because we can
imagine circumstances in which we do take the survival of the form to count as
survival of the cathedral. Imagine, for example, some future archaeologist at a
time when all that remains of Chartres is some vague and wildly laudatory
remarks in old letters who stumbles on an artbook that preserves complete diagrams of all parts of Chartres. He might well herald his discovery by saying
'Chartres is no longer lost to us.')
67. Aquinas's account thus satisfies Chisholm's constraint, which Chisholm

530

Faith and Philosophy

thinks is supported by our strong intuitions, that the mind must be a thing of
some sort and cannot be identified with anything like a set of properties.
(Chisholm 1991, p.169.) On Chisholm's view, the mind must be a substance.
For Aquinas, as r explain, when the mind exists in its disembodied state in the
separated soul, it is a part of a substance, like a severed hand or a partially built
house, and not a whole substance in its own right.
68. Stephen Yablo says that any "substance dualism worthy of the name
maintains at least that (1) I am not identical to my body" ("The Real Distinction
Between Mind and Body", in The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supplementary
volume 16 (1990), p.150). Whether or not Aquinas meets this test for substance
dualism depends on how (1) is understood. If we take (1) literally as it stands
(and this is how Yablo himself interprets it), then Aquinas accepts it, since in
some sense the corpse of a person also counts as that person's body. On the
other hand, if we are to understand 'body' in (1) as referring just to living
human bodies, then Aquinas would reject (1) since he thinks that a human
being is the matter-form composite of a living human body.
69. Daniel Dennett Consciousness Explained, (Little, Brown, and Co., 1991),
pp.33-37.
70. Sydney Shoemaker, Jdentity, Cause, and Mind, (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1984), p.141.
71. ST I q.7S a.2 ad 2.
72. Patricia Churchland, Neurophilosophy. Toward a Unified Science of the
Mind/Brain, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1990), p.352.
73. This is admittedly a very restricted sense of 'physicalism'. For some
attempt to clarify the different senses of 'physicalism' in current use, see
Howard Robinson, Objections to Physicalism, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993).
74. Richard Boyd, "Materialism without Reductionism: What Physicalism
Does Not Entail", in Readings in Philosophy of Psychology, ed. Ned Block, vol. 1,
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), p.SS.
75. Boyd 1980, p.S8.
76. Ibid., p.S8.
77. Ibid., p.97.
78. Boyd in fact qualifies this thesis with a distinction between narrow and
broad construals of the scope of states, events, and processes; but this distinction doesn't alter his general point and isn't relevant to the issues at hand.
79. Boyd asserts this claim with very little argument; for considerable careful and interesting argument for the claim, see Stephen Yablo, "The Real
Distinction Between Mind and Body", The Canadian Journal of Philosophy, supplementary volume 16 (1990) 149-201.
80. Boyd 1980, p.101.
81. Ibid., p.8S.
82. Ibid., p.97.
83. Unless I have misunderstood Boyd and he thinks it is possible for there
to be functioning mental phenomena existing on their own apart from both a
body and a mind. Something similar to or even identical with such a peculiar
theory seems to be held by N.M.LNathan, who says, "A person could be a
series of volitions connected causally or by their contents, or ... a single continuous activity in which all succession and variety belongs to the content of that
activity." ("Weak Materialism", in Robinson 1993, p.223).
84. Furthermore, Boyd like Aquinas takes configurational events, states, or
processes as dynamic, since he supposes that such dynamic conditions as
information-processing are configurational.
85. For someone who sees positions such as Boyd's as dualist, see Stephen
Yablo 1990, p.151 (where Yablo describes the claim that a human mind could
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have existed in the absence of all material objects a "genuinely challenging
form of dualism") and "Mental Causation", The Philosophical Review 101 (1992),
p.246.
86. This is the sense of materialism Howard Robinson has in mind when he
says, "One could, for example, have a materialist or physicalist theory of man
and hence of the human mind, whilst believing in the existence of non-human
immaterial spirits" (Robinson 1993, p.2).
87. See John Searle 1992, p.28.
88. Ibid., p.102.
89. For detailed and elaborate consideration of arguments for this conclusion, see David Braine, The Human Person. Animal and Spirit, (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1992). For arguments that Aquinas's account
of the soul occupies a halfway house between dualism and materialism, see
Brian Davies, The Thought of Thomas Aquinas, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).
Davies's discussion is very helpful, but a better way to describe Aquinas's
position, in my view, is as showing the mistakenness of the dichotomy
between materialism and dualism.
90. And if it is logically possible for disembodied minds to exist and function, then on Aquinas's understanding of omnipotence, God can bring about
such a state in this world.
91. lowe a debt of thanks to Bas van Fraassen and Peter van Inwagen, who
discussed some of these issues with me and suggested helpful literature while
I was preparing to write this paper, and to William Alston, David Burrell,
William Hasker, Brian Leftow, David Lewis, Scott MacDonald, Ernan
McMullin, and Alvin Plantinga, whose comments and questions on an earlier
draft were very useful. I'm particularly grateful to Norman Kretzmann for
valuable help at every stage of this paper.

